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ABSTRACT 
 
Can the current attitudes toward utopia be described as hollow space in the 
Blochian sense? The political debate is dominated by apocalyptic imagination which 
fuels populist movements but ultimately it does not have any emancipatory potential. 
Contemporary reflection on utopia can be either defined by a outopian attitude that is 
critical towards the status quo but sees alternative arrangements as no-places or as a 
contemplative utopia, that recognizes the need for utopian visions but cannot identify 
any political agency. Activism without utopian mental picture often disintegrates for 
lack of a unified goal and therefore cannot live up to its transformative potential. 
Retopia, the fourth attitude towards utopia could refocus the eutopian impulse and 
counter the apocalyptic imagination with a radical imagination that is based on the 
encouragement of political action. Politics is a confidence game and action inspired by 
retopian mental pictures could create a sense of an opening in the There is No Alternative 
doctrine that dominates the political sphere.. 
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LA IMAGINACIÓN RETÓPICA 
 
RESUMEN 
 
¿Pueden describirse las actitudes actuales hacia la utopía como un espacio vacío 
en el sentido Blochiano? El debate político está dominado por la imaginación 
apocalíptica que alimenta los movimientos populistas pero que, en última instancia, no 
tiene ningún potencial emancipatorio. La reflexión contemporánea sobre la utopía 
puede definirse por una actitud outópica, crítica hacia el status quo, pero que ve las 
propuestas alternativas como no-lugares o como una utopía contemplativa, que 
reconoce la necesidad de visiones utópicas pero no puede identificar a ninguna agencia 
política. El activismo sin imagen mental utópica a menudo se desintegra por falta de 
un objetivo unificado y, por lo tanto, no puede estar a la altura de su potencial 
transformador. Retopía, la cuarta actitud hacia la utopía podría reenfocar el impulso 
eutopista y contrarrestar la imaginación apocalíptica con una imaginación radical que 
se basa en el estímulo de la acción política. La política es un juego de confianza y la 
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acción inspirada en las imágenes mentales retópicas podría crear una sensación de 
apertura en la doctrina de No hay alternativa que domina la esfera política. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: outopía/eutopía, retopía, acción, imaginación, agencia política 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
In a conversation with Jürgen Rühle in 1964, Ernst Bloch described his epoch 
as hollow space (Hohlraum). Bloch saw a few sparkles in this hollow space but ultimately 
there was a vacuum of ideas that people were aware of. At best the prevailing feeling 
of emptiness could be described as boredom. At worst the Zeitgeist could be 
characterized as “despair that will mutate into nihilism”1.  
 
Four years after the interview the 1968 student protests broke out that 
embodied the spark, the desire for a different society. With hindsight, the changes on 
the socio-economic organization of Western society that followed were modest, the 
upheaval evaporated and most of its protagonists successfully integrated into the status 
quo. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis the critique of the politico-economic model 
resurfaced hence in less radical ways. But Bloch’s concern remains topical: are there 
still any sparkles left in the Hohlraum? And is the Hohlraum still a Hohlraum? 
 
By bracketing out the letter h in the middle of the German word Hohlraum, it 
becomes a Holraum, as space out of which you take things. Contemporary society could 
be thus more appropriately described by Ho(h)lraum, a hollow space out of which 
people try to take things out for their personal benefit. A sort of “takeaway lacuna”. 
This Ho(h)lraum-society has even less sparkles left than Bloch’s Hohlraum because 
nobody is willing to animate the hollow space as the only concern is to optimize the 
individual profit. The society is enclosed in its present state and excludes any form of 
collective imagination.  
 
In the individualistic absolute present, the future has become an 
uncomfortable dimension that is mostly perceived in apocalyptic terms or has entered 
the abyss of absence. Bloch himself warns that “without the dimension of the future, 
conceivable for us as an adequate future, no empirical being will endure long”2. He 
underlines the utopian dimension of this by explaining that: 
 
… in ages of growing darkness at least a horror vacui, and in ages of 
increasing enlightenment always a plus ultra, shows that Utopian 
                                                 
1 Ernst Bloch, Tendenz-Latenz-Utopie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978): 327-349. 
2 Ernst Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970): 92. 
330
The Retopian Imagination 
 
 
 
Librosdelacorte.es, PRIMAVERA-VERANO, nº 16, año 10 (2018). ISSN 1989-6425 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15366/ldc2018.10.16.018 
 
 
consciousness is alive. All the worse then, if a society that will no 
longer be reconciled in an abstract-utopian manner, but demands the 
way to the thing itself, errs on the way—and errs dangerously3. 
 
The desire for change has manifested itself in protest movements like the 
Indignados or Occupy and on the reactionary side in the Tea Party movement, 
Trumpism or in the rise of European right-wing parties. The question is why the 
movements on the left have disintegrated so quickly while the movements on the right 
have been integrated into the political decision making process. What does this 
integration reveal about the political imagination? The Tea Party and its European 
spiritual cousins are articulating some form of a glorification of the (lost) past, which 
according to Goodwin and Tyler “renders the thinker impotent with respect to both 
present or future”4. Hence their agenda of change has no emancipatory potential for 
the future. But this does not make these reactionary movements any less attractive. As 
Lilla points out the reactionaries have discovered that nostalgia can be a powerful 
motivator (especially in an aging society)5. While Bloch underlined that hope is superior 
to fear, Lilla maintains that nostalgia is “perhaps even more powerful than hope” 
because hopes can be disappointed whereas nostalgia is irrefutable6. 
 
On the left, the absence of a future image and possibly the too loose forms of 
organization have led to a quick disintegration and the potential of agency has vanished 
along with it. But this does not mean that the only alternative is nihilism or defeatism. 
Levitas writes that the “problem of agency does not arise because the desire for an 
alternative has weakened, but because hope depends on the transition appearing to be 
practically possible”7.  
 
As the importance of the factor of hope has been already conceptualized by 
Bloch, the realm of the possible has to be the focus of any emancipatory movement. 
Without a clear conceptualization (that remains flexible enough to be adjusted to 
changes in the social construct called society) of the possible, without an articulation 
of utopian mental images, political agency will ultimately vaporize and revert to 
criticism that helplessly mourns the hollow space without being able to imagine an 
alternative. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Ibidem: 92. 
4 Barbara Goodwin and Keith Tyler, The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice (London: 
Hutchinson, 1981): 23. 
5 Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind, On Political Reaction (New York: New York Review Books, 2016). 
6 Ibidem: xiv. 
7 Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Witney: Peter Lang, 2011): 228. 
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THE CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TO UTOPIA 
 
Judt attempts to answer the question of why it is so difficult to imagine a 
different society by pointing at the lack of reference. He states: 
 
Our disability is discursive: we simply do not know how to talk about these 
things anymore. For the last thirty years, when asking ourselves whether we 
support a policy, a proposal or an initiative, we have restricted ourselves to 
issues of profit and loss- economic questions in the narrowest sense. But this 
is not an instinctive human condition: it is an acquired taste8. 
 
The acquired taste of narrowed down economic thinking has also downsized 
the expectation towards possible social and political change unless the ideas are 
quantifiable in profit-loss categories. The contemporary approach to change, even 
more to utopian mental images of change is dominated by a skepticism that is 
cemented in the dogma: There is no alternative (TINA) to the existing social and 
economic arrangements. Among contemporary thinkers three basic attitudes in 
relation to social alternatives, possible reality-transcending political concepts and their 
manifestation through a utopian mental image can be described: contemporary outopia, 
contemplative utopia and activism without utopian mental picture. A classification could thus 
be: 
 
1) contemporary outopia (Fisher, Berardi, Augé, Hardt & Negri, Agamben): the 
attitude towards social alternatives is critical because the contemporary outopia 
is implicitly based on the premise that social change is not possible in an all-
englobing system. The world is more likely to change for worse, become a non-
place, an outopia and the political imagination is forever locked in the present 
framework. There are no discernible utopian mental images to be found in the 
contemporary outopia and the general attitude is in most cases fatalistic. The 
TINA premise (There Is No Alternative) is largely accepted. 
 
2) contemplative utopia (Jameson, Weiss, Jacoby, Thompson): the attitude towards 
social alternatives is generally positive, the need for utopian transformation is 
recognized and social change is considered to be theoretically possible however 
no concrete agency is articulated or even identified. The general positive 
function of Utopia as a reality transcending political concept is recognized 
however often with an ambiguous angle because of the historical failures of 
certain utopian concepts. The utopian mental image for the contemplative 
utopia would be a map, which is drawn with the intention to frame the complex 
realities. The need to draw a map indicates also a general uncertainty about the 
direction and shape of possible political change. 
 
                                                 
8 Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (London: Penguin, 2010): 34. 
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3) activism without utopian mental picture (Graeber, Haiven and Khasnabish): the 
attitude towards social alternatives is positive, activism is recognized as a way 
of changing the framework of society, theory is important but action is 
primordial. There are reality transcending political concepts but they are largely 
rooted in anarchism (or anarcho-syndicalism) and feminism in some rarer cases 
(none of the above-mentioned authors) still from Marxism. The reality 
transcending concepts generally do not contain a concrete image of utopian 
futures but are more ideological orientation points, which conceptually frame 
the political struggle. 
 
This classification makes clear that agency and utopia are largely disconnected 
from each other in contemporary perception of the possibilities of social change. For 
any social transformation to be conceivable the two domains of agency and utopian 
thinking would have to be connected to each other. Hence a fourth category, an 
aspirational category, is needed in order to connect agency and utopian mental image. 
A reconstructive utopia in the sense Mumford (1922) defined it “a reconstituted 
environment that is better adapted to the nature and aims of the human beings who 
dwell within it than the actual one”9. In the contemporary context any claim to human 
nature is not only problematic but also superfluous, hence the retopia is a eutopia (so 
the aim is to improve the social arrangements) that explicitly grounds the utopian in 
the local environment and not in abstract universals. The retopia can be thus classified 
as the fourth basic attitude towards utopia: 
 
4) retopia: the attitude towards social change is positive, activism is recognized as 
a way of changing the framework of society. Agency is at the basis of political 
change. This agency is grounded in a utopian mental image that is open to 
change but serves as a catalyst and compass that will avoid the segregation and 
disintegration of the political struggle. Retopia is a eutopia with the claim to be 
put into practice through social experimentation on the ground (with an open 
outcome). 
 
The retopia has with Wright’s real utopia in common that it is” 
grounded in the belief that what is pragmatically possible is not fixed 
independently of our imaginations, but is itself shaped by our visions.”10 Self-
fulfilling prophecies are powerful forces in history. This optimism refutes the 
reigning fatalism of many contemporary thinkers. It is explicitly based on the 
possibilities of political agency and is an encouragement to leave the TINA 
dogma behind. The key factors are: imagination, will and action. 
 
Out of the four different types of utopianism, the contemporary outopia, the 
contemplative utopia, activism without utopian mental picture and the retopia, the later type is 
                                                 
9 Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922): 14. 
10 Eric Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (London: Verso, 2010): 6. 
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the only type of utopianism having the potential to animate political agency for more 
than just a season or two of protest. The retopia, in its focus on agency is countering 
the passivity of the “idiots” (in Arendt’s sense) and in its open-ness it is a resistance to 
any kind of political fundamentalisms.  
 
Nicole Pohl’s definition of Utopia is also valid for retopia. Pohl argues that: 
 
Utopia is and must be flexible, heterogeneous, local yet global, located at the 
blurring boundaries of the aesthetic, ethical, juridical and political. Utopia 
demonstrates the continual exploration of that which is possible11. 
 
In the context of retopia, “blurring boundaries” does not mean diffused focus 
but openness to other priorities than disciplinary borders and narrow knowledge 
generation.  
 
 
APOCALYPTIC VERSUS RADICAL IMAGINATION 
 
The possible new “islands of retopia” can be located not in the future or in a 
remote place but in the middle of Western societies. Local social experiments can 
generate a new form of activism that is not based on abstract critique but on self-
generated knowledge about social alternatives. Each local social experiment can agree 
on a common value system and the plurality of experiments that are all locally rooted 
can also provide a plurality of different experiences. TINA becomes TAMA (There 
are Many Alternatives). All the know-how and all the locations that are left-overs of 
the capitalist transformation binge can be bundled to generate new forms of social 
organization. Therefore, retopia is based on the importance of a vision of different 
futures, on the power of imagination, on the volition and on the constitutive power of 
action. 
As Bloch pointed out the connection between action and utopia: 
 
Action will release available transitional tendencies into active freedom only 
if the Utopian goal is clearly visible, unadulterated and unrenounced. Even 
though the Utopias have at best promised their still so palpable optima, but 
have promised them as objectively and really possible12. 
 
In that understanding, Utopia and political action combined are the possible 
remedies against the nostalgia that permeated among the reactionary political parties 
in Europe and the United States. The right-wing populism is explicitly based on an 
apocalyptic imagination. As Lilla argues: 
 
                                                 
11 Nicole Pohl, "Utopia Matters", Spaces of Utopia, 7 (2009): 1-14, 10. 
12 Bloch A Philosophy of the Future: 92. 
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For the apocalyptic imagination, the present, not the past, is a foreign country. 
That is why it is so inclined to dream of a second event that will blow open 
the doors of paradise. Its attention is fixed on the horizon as it awaits the 
Messiah, the Revolution, the Leader, or the end of time itself13. 
 
As this definition shows, the apocalyptic imagination is not only limited to 
religious or reactionary groups but also to left-wing radicals who advocate a revolution. 
The implicit dimension in this perception of political change is a catastrophe of a 
significant scale. The absolute scale of change (and the implied human casualties in the 
process) that the apocalyptic imagination is based on are an echo of some of the most 
terrible political crimes of the 20th century. Despite (or because of) the epic scale of 
the anticipated catastrophe, in the apocalyptic imagination the agency is very limited. 
The alternative to apocalyptic imagination is radical imagination. 
 
The concept of radical imagination by Haiven and Khasnabish highlights the 
importance of collective imagination. Radical imagination is defined as an “aspirational 
term” which aims at imagining “the world, life and social institutions” with the explicit 
recognition “that the world can and should be changed”14. Haiven and Khasnabish 
underline that: 
 
… the radical imagination is not just about dreaming about different futures. 
It’s about bringing those possible futures ‘back’ to work on the present, to 
inspire action and new forms of solidarity today. Likewise, the radical 
imagination is about drawing on the past, telling different stories about how 
the world came to be the way it is, and remembering the power and 
importance of past struggles and the way their spirits live on in the present15. 
 
The focus of radical imagination is “to imagine and make common cause with 
the experiences of other people” and “to build solidarity across boundaries and 
borders, real or imagined”16 with the explicit intention to undermine the existing power 
structures. The collective dimension is thus not only an ethical dimension, but has also 
the dimension of enlarging the scope, as Haiven and Khasnabish explain: 
 
…we understand the imagination as not merely the ‘private property’ of the 
individual. Through shared experiences, language, stories, ideas, art and 
theory we share part of our imagination. We create, with those around us, 
multiple, overlapping, contradictory and coexistent imaginary landscapes, 
horizons of common possibility and shared understanding17. 
 
                                                 
13 Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: 137. 
14 Max Haiven and Alex Khasnabish, The Radical Imagination: Social Movement Research in the Age of 
Austerity (London: Zed, 2014): 3. 
15 Ibidem: 3. 
16 Ibidem: 3.  
17 Haiven and Khasnabish, The Radical Imagination: 3. 
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Thus, solidarity and imagination are intertwined in the form of a “shared 
landscape and a common resource that both informs our actions and relationships and 
is, in turn, shaped by our actions and relationships”18. So in radical imagination the 
creative force of the individual is enhanced through the creation of shared imaginaries. 
 
 
ACTION AT THE POINT OF BIFURCATION 
 
As the lasting impact of neoliberalism shows, in politics, imagination (and the 
scope of the imagination) has a transformative potential. As Graeber explains, politics 
“is the art of persuasion; the political is that dimension of social life in which things 
really do become true if enough people believe them.”19 In reverse this means that if 
nobody believes in change because there is not enough imagination then stagnation 
becomes the status quo. In Graeber’s understanding politics is a confidence game that 
is “very similar to magic”. As Graeber illustrates the political process: 
 
If you managed to convince everyone on earth that you can breathe under 
water, it won’t make a difference: if you try it you will still drown. On the 
other hand, if you could convince everyone in the entire world that you were 
the King of France, then you would actually be the King of France. (In fact, 
it would probably work just to convince a substantial portion of the French 
civil service and military)20. 
 
This shows the power of confidence games and ideas in the political process. 
While the political reality is obviously more complex, in its essence “political power 
has to be constantly recreated persuading others to recognize one’s power”21. That 
means any contemplative attitude towards politics is a way of renouncing political 
power. Persuasion and action are the fundaments of political power. As Hannah 
Arendt clarifies “men constantly create their own, self-made conditions” 22 . So, 
according to Arendt, “since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, not 
mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical 
thought”23. Action is the domain of the political and inactivity or passivity merely leads 
to the domestication of the citizens. Therefore, a figure like Bartleby can never be 
political because he opts for a fatalistic retreat24. As Arendt observed already in the 
1950s, a tendency towards excluding action was a way of standardizing societies and 
producing conformity. Arendt writes: 
                                                 
18 Ibidem: 226. 
19 David Graeber, Debt: The first 500 Years (New York: Melville House, 2012): 322. 
20 David Graeber, Revolutions in Reverse, Essays on Politics, Violence, Art and Imagination (New York: 
Minor Compositions, 2011): 94. 
21 Ibidem: 94. 
22 Hannah Arendt,The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998): 9. 
23 Ibidem: 40. 
24 For more on the difference between Bartleby and utopian imagination, see Dirk Hoyer, "The 
Possibility of Another Island: Utopian Discourse in the Age of Dystopia", Antae 4-1 (2017): 25-37. 
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It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, 
which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects 
from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable 
and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to make them 
behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement25. 
 
As action can have unpredictable consequences, political control means 
replacing action with behavior, which means normalized activity in a regular 
predictable frame. Arendt sees that this conformism, “the assumption that men behave 
and do not act with respect to each other, that lies at the root of the modern science 
of economics”26. So behavior is the category of the homo economicus, the formatted 
homo sapiens. 
 
With the rise of neo-liberalism this homo economicus was distilled even 
further because the domain of the imagination was colonized in the same way as the 
domain of action. Graeber (2011) remarks that “the neoliberal project really has been 
stripped down to what was always its essence: not an economic project at all, but a 
political project, designed to devastate the imagination, and willing”27. 
 
But action, imagination and willing are closely connected, not only but also in 
the political process. Arendt lays the connection open by tracing back the etymological 
roots of action: 
 
Greek and Latin, unlike the modern languages, contain two altogether 
different and yet interrelated words with which to designate the verb “to act”. 
To the two Greek verbs archein (“to begin”, “to lead”, finally “to rule”) and 
prattein (“to pass through”, “to achieve”, “to finish”) correspond the two 
Latin verbs agree (“to set in motion”, “to lead”) and gerere (whose original 
meaning is “to bear”). Here it seems as though each action were divided in 
two parts, the beginning made by a single person and the achievement in 
which many join by “bearing” and “finishing” the enterprise, by seeing it 
through28. 
 
Action thus means to begin and then convince others to join. In an 
environment of conformism every beginning is met with rejection because it 
transcends the frame of normalized regular behavior and ultimately challenges the status 
quo. Thus, action is not only at the root of politics but also at the root of utopia. 
Utopias “boost human activity” and “deliberate collective action 29 , as Levitas 
underlines. Action is the entry ticket into the confidence game of political 
                                                 
25 Arendt, The Human Condition: 40. 
26 Ibidem: 41. 
27 Graeber, Revolutions in Reverse: 5-6. 
28 Arendt, The Human Condition: 189. 
29 Levitas, The Concept of Utopia: 196. 
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transformation. But action in the framework of enclosure (of political imagination) 
and in the absence of a utopian mental picture risks to be co-opted by the status quo. 
Immanuel Wallerstein claims that there are at least two alternatives: 
 
If we are making a fundamental historical choice in the next fifty years, what 
is it between? Clearly, our choice is between a system (analogous to the 
present one in some fundamentals) in which some have significantly greater 
privileges than others, and one that is relatively democratic and egalitarian. 
With much, much more value produced, the difference between the top 
stratum and the rest could be and has been far greater than in the other 
historical systems, even if it is true that the top stratum of the present system 
has included a larger percentage of the system’s overall population than that 
of preceding historical systems30. 
 
Wallerstein developed in Utopistics a hybrid between historic determinism and 
individual or collective agency. In the context of his world systems theory, Wallerstein 
explains that the capitalist world economy (which started roughly at the time of 
Thomas More’s Utopia) is coming to an end and that we are living in a time of 
transition to a yet unknown new world system. In these times of transitional 
TimeSpace, or points of bifurcation as Wallerstein calls them, the influence of the free 
will factor is far higher than in the times of the ongoing life of the world system. For 
Wallerstein, the French and the Russian Revolution ultimately did not result in any 
world historical change because they happened at the wrong moment, when the world 
system was not yet at the point of transition. Wallerstein explains that: 
 
… when systems are functioning normally, structural determinism outweighs 
individual and group free will. But in times of crisis and transition, the freewill 
factor becomes central. The world of 2050 will be what we make it. This 
leaves full rein for our agency, for our commitment, and for our moral 
judgment. It also means that this period will be a time of terrible political 
struggle, because the stakes are much higher than in so-called normal times31. 
 
 
FUTURE REIMAGINED? 
 
The places for experimenting with what Wallerstein calls the “relatively 
democratic and egalitarian” alternative might be opening up in the places that have lost 
their value (in the sense of capitalist value generation) like some areas in Southern 
Europe or deindustrialized cities in the US such as Detroit. The ruins of capitalism 
might provide the space for developing forms of living that are guided neither by 
neoliberal dogmatism nor by apocalyptic imagination. The question is whether places 
                                                 
30 Immanuel Wallerstein, Utopistics, Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century (New York: The 
New Press, 1998): 69. 
31 Ibidem: 64. 
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like Detroit become the avant-garde of new social arrangements, if the city gets re-
gentrified or if the social fragmentation engendered by the economic decline leads to 
a hostile environment? The need for laboratories in the research and development of 
new social, economic and political forms of organization is manifest. Any local 
example for the success of different forms of social organization (that is not an abstract 
theory but a lived experience) can create a sense of opening of the enclosure. 
 
For, as Graeber underlines, “the moment there appears to be any sense of 
opening, the imagination will immediately spring forth.”32 This imagination has the 
potential to animate an increasing part of the population of (Western) societies who 
have currently opted to be “idiots” (in the Arendt sense) or who have been outsourced 
into passivity (e.g. the unemployed youth in Southern Europe). But as pervious social 
and art movements have shown, this energy can be also diffused if it lacks a utopian 
vision. Art and science can contribute to this process by not reproducing the enclosure 
in their practice and by including a utopian dimension into the generation of 
knowledge. Mumford declares that: “Though the paralysis of the arts and sciences our 
contemporary programs for revolution and reform have done very little to lift our 
heads over the disorderly and bedraggled environments in which we conduct our daily 
business.”33 Although the idea of revolution has henceforth found its justified place in 
the advertising world (or in the apocalyptic imagination), the idea of utopian political 
transformation is certainly only present in the “bedraggled“ margins of arts and 
sciences. Hence the “paralysis” and the sense of not lifting the heads high enough.  
 
Although Thomas More was most likely not aware that he lived at the 
beginning of a world system that, in Wallerstein’s interpretation, lasted for more than 
500 years, he developed utopian visions as a result of the diffuse feeling of historical 
transformation. If we accept Wallerstein’s premise, then the importance of the free 
will factor and therefore of political agency is of foremost importance in shaping the 
future. Being enclosed in the Ho(h)lraum-society there is now a possibility to open the 
“takeaway lacuna” with ideas that at least potentially could lead to a different future 
that is not imprisoned in “end” or “post” metaphors. 
 
 
** 
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